Sample of Student Work
Moss
PHIL 3600/Metaphysics
February 17, 2012
Analysis of Parmenides’s Knowledge Passage (134a-134e)
Plato’s Theory of Forms has pervaded the history of philosophy. Any student of the subject has at some point focused his or her attention toward this concept. Introduced in Plato’s Parmenides, the theory argues that non-material entities, known as forms, define the ultimate realm of reality. Defended by a young Socrates, the theory comes under fundamental criticisms by Parmenides, an older and assumingly wiser philosopher. One such example of these criticisms focuses on the consequences of the problem of participation. Parmenides demonstrates this flaw in the theory in a passage discussing Knowledge. Yet, Parmenides fails to account for the obvious in this segment, ignoring the importance of the actual words he uses. Still, ultimately, this text is a Platonic argument, revealing the true nature of Plato’s philosophies.
Early in the text, Parmenides engages with the then young Socrates in an exercise of argument. Defending his and Zeno’s theories of the One and the nonexistence of the Many, Parmenides begins to chip away at the theory proposed by Socrates, the Theory of the Forms. After some discussion, Parmenides broaches one of the most fundamental challenges to the theory: the problem of participation. Through the exploration of how particulars might relate to their corresponding forms, Socrates begins to realize how large of an obstruction this might be. If particulars partake in their forms, then there must be some quality shared between the form and the particular. This shared quality, this likeness due to its shared nature then subjugates the primary form to the position of a particular. However, by doing so, an infinite regress is created, continually discovering a new form only to subjugate again to the status of a particular. Thus, the problem of participation is agreed upon, even by young Socrates. As a result, Parmenides argues that it is illogical to claim that particulars could share a likeness with the forms and vice versa. Therefore, he says, there must be a distinct separation between the forms and the particulars.
Working from this premise, Parmenides decides to utilize the example of Knowledge to prove his imminent argument. He draws distinction between knowledge as a particular and Knowledge as a form. The particular knowledge is defined as knowledge of other particulars; the form as Knowledge of other forms. However, due to the earlier establishment of a separation of forms from particulars, Parmenides asserts that knowledge and Knowledge cannot be like each other. That likeness would refer back to the problem of participation which ends in an illogical infinity according to the Greeks. If knowledge and Knowledge are completely unalike and participate in no way with one another, then knowledge cannot discern the forms, for only Knowledge can. Human beings as particulars in nature only have knowledge. Thus, Parmenides shows it is impossible for humans to possess or know of the form of Knowledge. This leads logically that since one cannot possess Knowledge, one cannot know of the other forms.
Socrates, like his theory, seems deflated. Yet, Parmenides continues his barrage, delving into further implications of this impasse. The discussion moves toward god, or any entity which participates in the realm of the forms. Such a god would inarguably possess the form of Knowledge, and therefore know of all the forms. However, due to the separated nature of the particular and form realms, this Knowledge cannot be like the knowledge of particulars. Through this rift, Parmenides shows that Knowledge cannot know of the world of particulars, and therefore, neither may any entity partaking in Knowledge. The result it seems is that a god would not only know nothing of the world of particulars, but have no connection whatsoever to it. Thus, the concept of god as a being active in the world of particulars is refuted, leaving Socrates astonished.
Parmenides’s argument appears sound; Socrates himself acquiesces. Yet, an analysis of the most simplistic aspect of this argument reveals its flaws. Forms can be defined as the ultimate entities of reality. These forms are claimed to exist because there are qualities between particulars which are inherently shared. The forms, it seems, can come to represent the truth of these shared qualities. A form of a Table is the truth of what it means to be a table, and all particular instances of a table participate somehow in this form. Parmenides’s thesis in this passage is that if there are forms, humans given their particular nature cannot know of them. Yet, Parmenides argues using words. His argument implicitly recognizes that words are verbal representations of concepts held by human beings. These concepts are shared across particular instances; one who can speak intelligibly speaks with knowledge of words and their definitions. Parmenides thus fails to see words as comparable to forms.
By perceiving words as verbal representations of forms, in that they both can be considered manifestations of shared qualities of particulars, any argument that speaks intelligibly concedes to some idea of forms. In this passage, Parmenides concludes that Knowledge is unknowable. However, to even speak of knowledge, what it is, and how it comes to be, one must first have a, at best, semi-graspable understanding of Knowledge. Speech refers back to some concept of forms, acknowledging there are shared qualities between particulars which may be known as forms. Therefore, while Parmenides’s argument seems to hold credence, his use of words, and intelligible ones at that, innately recognizes Knowledge must be somewhat knowable. Otherwise, how else could one make references to it?
Still, speech can be seen only as a particular. Every instance of a word is a particular case, each time perhaps used with different meanings. As a result, it is impossible to use speech as humans have to argue definitively for the existence of forms. Particulars, as understood in Platonic text, can only point to their forms, never encompass them. Thus, it seems although words do demonstrate the notion of forms is possible, they further demonstrate the impossibility of using words to fully and flawlessly grasp a form. The only thing words indicate is the utter ungraspable nature of the forms themselves.
Ultimately though, this passage, and the work as a whole, is written by Plato. Thus, one cannot only look at the words of Parmenides, but must delve deeper and analyze their value in Plato’s overall argument. From this passage, an understanding has been drawn: forms can be grasped (as shown by the value of words), but only to a partial extent (as shown by the particular nature of words). In the context of Platonic arguments, this understanding and this passage can be utilized to further one of Plato’s philosophical stances. Metaphysics is self-perspective. It must ask itself what questions it must ask. Plato makes this point clear through this passage. Philosophers must learn to ask if concepts are even knowable or graspable. What can human beings actually know, and what is beyond the realm of human mental capacity? Through the challenges encountered by Socrates courtesy of his opponent Parmenides, Plato demonstrates the importance of asking the right questions. Plato, a man of inquiry, set the stage for metaphysics in this way.
This passage provides interesting insight into the beginnings of the challenges of metaphysics. One of the most acknowledged theories, Plato’s Forms, comes under direct fire by the man who proposes it himself. Through his character of Parmenides, Plato undermines his theory, showing its fundamental flaws and challenging its own validity. Defended by an inexperienced Socrates, the theory stands, at best, on weak legs. Speech comes to assist. Words show some idea of the forms must be valid, otherwise words and names would cease to have value. Still, this defense only proves to show that although some type of “form” must exist, such forms are impossible to describe using the particular nature of words. Plato’s theory is diminished. His relentless self-criticism seems philosophically suicidal. Yet, Plato’s text is superficial. Rather, the exercise is the true purpose. This passage asks what is knowable and shows how to truly delve into a theory. A philosopher must consistently be criticizing herself to better her argument, while simultaneously asking what she even has the capacity to know. This is Plato in true spirit: a man of inquiry and grandfather of metaphysics.
PHIL 3600/Metaphysics
February 17, 2012
Analysis of Parmenides’s Knowledge Passage (134a-134e)
Plato’s Theory of Forms has pervaded the history of philosophy. Any student of the subject has at some point focused his or her attention toward this concept. Introduced in Plato’s Parmenides, the theory argues that non-material entities, known as forms, define the ultimate realm of reality. Defended by a young Socrates, the theory comes under fundamental criticisms by Parmenides, an older and assumingly wiser philosopher. One such example of these criticisms focuses on the consequences of the problem of participation. Parmenides demonstrates this flaw in the theory in a passage discussing Knowledge. Yet, Parmenides fails to account for the obvious in this segment, ignoring the importance of the actual words he uses. Still, ultimately, this text is a Platonic argument, revealing the true nature of Plato’s philosophies.
Early in the text, Parmenides engages with the then young Socrates in an exercise of argument. Defending his and Zeno’s theories of the One and the nonexistence of the Many, Parmenides begins to chip away at the theory proposed by Socrates, the Theory of the Forms. After some discussion, Parmenides broaches one of the most fundamental challenges to the theory: the problem of participation. Through the exploration of how particulars might relate to their corresponding forms, Socrates begins to realize how large of an obstruction this might be. If particulars partake in their forms, then there must be some quality shared between the form and the particular. This shared quality, this likeness due to its shared nature then subjugates the primary form to the position of a particular. However, by doing so, an infinite regress is created, continually discovering a new form only to subjugate again to the status of a particular. Thus, the problem of participation is agreed upon, even by young Socrates. As a result, Parmenides argues that it is illogical to claim that particulars could share a likeness with the forms and vice versa. Therefore, he says, there must be a distinct separation between the forms and the particulars.
Working from this premise, Parmenides decides to utilize the example of Knowledge to prove his imminent argument. He draws distinction between knowledge as a particular and Knowledge as a form. The particular knowledge is defined as knowledge of other particulars; the form as Knowledge of other forms. However, due to the earlier establishment of a separation of forms from particulars, Parmenides asserts that knowledge and Knowledge cannot be like each other. That likeness would refer back to the problem of participation which ends in an illogical infinity according to the Greeks. If knowledge and Knowledge are completely unalike and participate in no way with one another, then knowledge cannot discern the forms, for only Knowledge can. Human beings as particulars in nature only have knowledge. Thus, Parmenides shows it is impossible for humans to possess or know of the form of Knowledge. This leads logically that since one cannot possess Knowledge, one cannot know of the other forms.
Socrates, like his theory, seems deflated. Yet, Parmenides continues his barrage, delving into further implications of this impasse. The discussion moves toward god, or any entity which participates in the realm of the forms. Such a god would inarguably possess the form of Knowledge, and therefore know of all the forms. However, due to the separated nature of the particular and form realms, this Knowledge cannot be like the knowledge of particulars. Through this rift, Parmenides shows that Knowledge cannot know of the world of particulars, and therefore, neither may any entity partaking in Knowledge. The result it seems is that a god would not only know nothing of the world of particulars, but have no connection whatsoever to it. Thus, the concept of god as a being active in the world of particulars is refuted, leaving Socrates astonished.
Parmenides’s argument appears sound; Socrates himself acquiesces. Yet, an analysis of the most simplistic aspect of this argument reveals its flaws. Forms can be defined as the ultimate entities of reality. These forms are claimed to exist because there are qualities between particulars which are inherently shared. The forms, it seems, can come to represent the truth of these shared qualities. A form of a Table is the truth of what it means to be a table, and all particular instances of a table participate somehow in this form. Parmenides’s thesis in this passage is that if there are forms, humans given their particular nature cannot know of them. Yet, Parmenides argues using words. His argument implicitly recognizes that words are verbal representations of concepts held by human beings. These concepts are shared across particular instances; one who can speak intelligibly speaks with knowledge of words and their definitions. Parmenides thus fails to see words as comparable to forms.
By perceiving words as verbal representations of forms, in that they both can be considered manifestations of shared qualities of particulars, any argument that speaks intelligibly concedes to some idea of forms. In this passage, Parmenides concludes that Knowledge is unknowable. However, to even speak of knowledge, what it is, and how it comes to be, one must first have a, at best, semi-graspable understanding of Knowledge. Speech refers back to some concept of forms, acknowledging there are shared qualities between particulars which may be known as forms. Therefore, while Parmenides’s argument seems to hold credence, his use of words, and intelligible ones at that, innately recognizes Knowledge must be somewhat knowable. Otherwise, how else could one make references to it?
Still, speech can be seen only as a particular. Every instance of a word is a particular case, each time perhaps used with different meanings. As a result, it is impossible to use speech as humans have to argue definitively for the existence of forms. Particulars, as understood in Platonic text, can only point to their forms, never encompass them. Thus, it seems although words do demonstrate the notion of forms is possible, they further demonstrate the impossibility of using words to fully and flawlessly grasp a form. The only thing words indicate is the utter ungraspable nature of the forms themselves.
Ultimately though, this passage, and the work as a whole, is written by Plato. Thus, one cannot only look at the words of Parmenides, but must delve deeper and analyze their value in Plato’s overall argument. From this passage, an understanding has been drawn: forms can be grasped (as shown by the value of words), but only to a partial extent (as shown by the particular nature of words). In the context of Platonic arguments, this understanding and this passage can be utilized to further one of Plato’s philosophical stances. Metaphysics is self-perspective. It must ask itself what questions it must ask. Plato makes this point clear through this passage. Philosophers must learn to ask if concepts are even knowable or graspable. What can human beings actually know, and what is beyond the realm of human mental capacity? Through the challenges encountered by Socrates courtesy of his opponent Parmenides, Plato demonstrates the importance of asking the right questions. Plato, a man of inquiry, set the stage for metaphysics in this way.
This passage provides interesting insight into the beginnings of the challenges of metaphysics. One of the most acknowledged theories, Plato’s Forms, comes under direct fire by the man who proposes it himself. Through his character of Parmenides, Plato undermines his theory, showing its fundamental flaws and challenging its own validity. Defended by an inexperienced Socrates, the theory stands, at best, on weak legs. Speech comes to assist. Words show some idea of the forms must be valid, otherwise words and names would cease to have value. Still, this defense only proves to show that although some type of “form” must exist, such forms are impossible to describe using the particular nature of words. Plato’s theory is diminished. His relentless self-criticism seems philosophically suicidal. Yet, Plato’s text is superficial. Rather, the exercise is the true purpose. This passage asks what is knowable and shows how to truly delve into a theory. A philosopher must consistently be criticizing herself to better her argument, while simultaneously asking what she even has the capacity to know. This is Plato in true spirit: a man of inquiry and grandfather of metaphysics.
